HDHomeRun Prime DLNA & XBMC

[gtb]

Is secure execution environment not a requirement anymore for copy protected TV?

Yes, it is, for certification (and therefore, sale). In other forums I believe someone claimed that the certification costs alone were probably at least $250K (when you include the fully encumbered costs of the process). I do not know if that is the right number, but it clearly suggests that the costs are high enough that building that secure execution environment, and then certifying it, is going to be expensive (proof by example: TiVo is running Linux in a closed box environment, so a protected environment is demonstrated as being done for closed box solutions running Linux).

I do agree with others that building a secure execution environment on a non-closed box solution may not be certifiable due to the ability to modify/obtain the data in transit (and in any event, would only be able to be displayed on fully encrypted paths, and AFAIK for Linux, even nVidia in their binary driver does not support HDCP).

[calic]

I am not aware of any type of secure execution environment within the DLNA specification, or implemented in DLNA products for example SoftDMA2

Let's discuss this issue first. SoftDMA2 is DLNA certified and complies with DTCP-IP. The player and the content server are different devices separated by a secure content link; in this context HDHR is your content server. If you claim that a secure environment is not implemented on SoftDMA2 how do you propose verification by the content server that apparently must adhere to higher standards trust this DMP? A few select pre-approved DMPs only?

Second, DTCP already spells out certain requirements for adopters with specific requirements for pay TV. The requirements are more robust for copy-never than an other CCI flag. So it not out of the question that multiple tiers of compatible DMP devices could be produced. The requirements also mention "robustness." This is the big question mark when it comes down to whom gets certified.

scrambled on-disk binaries, otherwise the player code can be reverse engineered, binary-hacked, patched in memory, code and data can monitored and captured in the clear while executing, etc.

Windows doesn't do anything fancy to prevent this. They move the core down to the kernel and then monitor for injection of non-microsoft signed kernel modules. This is all at the platform not application level. As mentioned previously, Android already runs on highly secure devices with hardware based encryption and key storage. More of the solution is already implemented in hardware than in Microsoft's case.

Keeping certain elements secure within the application binary is a separate issue. DVD and Blu-ray players need to keep a set of issued keys private. Thus an added element of security is required. A DMP similarly must secure its private key. This is the only real challenge and it is unrelated to the aforementioned Windows Media Foundation or its "protected environment." More on this topic below.

Also I don't want anyone to get the wrong idea that somehow Android is better than Windows because that sentiment get around enough already. My argument is simply constructed that any platform with the proper components can be made secure.

What's missing from your outline is what I referred to as a Protected Environment. This already exists in Microsoft Media Foundation, and is also available in various forms for applications via third party vendors for example, ArcSoft TMT Blu ray player uses Themida from Oreans.com

I have been addressing the concerns around hardware and platform integration so far. I did not mention any details for implementing a software application.

In terms of software, Android already provides the framework for implementing DRM. What you're referring to is middleware. Although full binary encryption, encapsulation, obfuscation, etc. generally plays a role in paranoia, it is the DRM core that needs protection. Nobody actual cares if you hack the interface to make the play button look like a gorilla. With reference to middleware, solutions can be bought for Android that comply with OMA that's integrated on many Android devices. In specific OMA already has a BCAST standard for implementing DRM for mobile TV.

Referring back to the platforms, they are already highly secure, and far more secure than any PC, with everything from encrypted and signed boot loaders to on chip secure key storage. In terms of security these platforms provided end-to-end security well in excess of what is available on a typical PC. It would be unrealistic to expect a majority of PCs to have smart cards but this is not unexpected for a large share of Android devices. Thus, BCAST supports content protection via smart card. Secure content path and content protection becomes much easier when you view all the hardware and software solutions already available for the Android platform. As of Android 4.0 both TXE and SE are available for secure process isolation and secure storage with UICC access.

[tcc]

Is secure execution environment not a requirement anymore for copy protected TV?

Yes, it is, for certification (and therefore, sale). In other forums I believe someone claimed that the certification costs alone were probably at least $250K (when you include the fully encumbered costs of the process). I do not know if that is the right number, but it clearly suggests that the costs are high enough that building that secure execution environment, and then certifying it, is going to be expensive (proof by example: TiVo is running Linux in a closed box environment, so a protected environment is demonstrated as being done for closed box solutions running Linux).

I do agree with others that building a secure execution environment on a non-closed box solution may not be certifiable due to the ability to modify/obtain the data in transit (and in any event, would only be able to be displayed on fully encrypted paths, and AFAIK for Linux, even nVidia in their binary driver does not support HDCP).

Actually, WMC is an example---the only example---of a certified non closed-box solution. It's not that it can't be done, it's just that after all these years no vendor except Microsoft has made the investment to build and support something like this.

Unfortunately though, MS has over the past few years steadily reduced investment in WMC to the point where today it gets no investment.

[tcc]

I am not aware of any type of secure execution environment within the DLNA specification, or implemented in DLNA products for example SoftDMA2

Let's discuss this issue first. SoftDMA2 is DLNA certified and complies with DTCP-IP. The player and the content server are different devices separated by a secure content link; in this context HDHR is your content server. If you claim that a secure environment is not implemented on SoftDMA2 how do you propose verification by the content server that apparently must adhere to higher standards trust this DMP? A few select pre-approved DMPs only?

Second, DTCP already spells out certain requirements for adopters with specific requirements for pay TV. The requirements are more robust for copy-never than an other CCI flag. So it not out of the question that multiple tiers of compatible DMP devices could be produced. The requirements also mention "robustness." This is the big question mark when it comes down to whom gets certified.

scrambled on-disk binaries, otherwise the player code can be reverse engineered, binary-hacked, patched in memory, code and data can monitored and captured in the clear while executing, etc.

Windows doesn't do anything fancy to prevent this. They move the core down to the kernel and then monitor for injection of non-microsoft signed kernel modules. This is all at the platform not application level. As mentioned previously, Android already runs on highly secure devices with hardware based encryption and key storage. More of the solution is already implemented in hardware than in Microsoft's case.

Keeping certain elements secure within the application binary is a separate issue. DVD and Blu-ray players need to keep a set of issued keys private. Thus an added element of security is required. A DMP similarly must secure its private key. This is the only real challenge and it is unrelated to the aforementioned Windows Media Foundation or its "protected environment." More on this topic below.

Also I don't want anyone to get the wrong idea that somehow Android is better than Windows because that sentiment get around enough already. My argument is simply constructed that any platform with the proper components can be made secure.

What's missing from your outline is what I referred to as a Protected Environment. This already exists in Microsoft Media Foundation, and is also available in various forms for applications via third party vendors for example, ArcSoft TMT Blu ray player uses Themida from Oreans.com

I have been addressing the concerns around hardware and platform integration so far. I did not mention any details for implementing a software application.

In terms of software, Android already provides the framework for implementing DRM. What you're referring to is middleware. Although full binary encryption, encapsulation, obfuscation, etc. generally plays a role in paranoia, it is the DRM core that needs protection. Nobody actual cares if you hack the interface to make the play button look like a gorilla. With reference to middleware, solutions can be bought for Android that comply with OMA that's integrated on many Android devices. In specific OMA already has a BCAST standard for implementing DRM for mobile TV.

Referring back to the platforms, they are already highly secure, and far more secure than any PC, with everything from encrypted and signed boot loaders to on chip secure key storage. In terms of security these platforms provided end-to-end security well in excess of what is available on a typical PC. It would be unrealistic to expect a majority of PCs to have smart cards but this is not unexpected for a large share of Android devices. Thus, BCAST supports content protection via smart card. Secure content path and content protection becomes much easier when you view all the hardware and software solutions already available for the Android platform. As of Android 4.0 both TXE and SE are available for secure process isolation and secure storage with UICC access.

I think the context of the thread is XBMC + Project Connect, not sealed-box players that you are talking about.

People are trying to understand whether SD's Project Connect will enable players like PC based XBMC to be able to play copy protected TV. Some people run XBMC on Windows and others run it on Linux, and all of us would like to see more than just WMC for playing copy protected TV.

I'm not seeing anything in SoftDMA2 that would allow it to be certified to play copy protected TV.

[calic]

I think the context of the thread is XBMC + Project Connect, not sealed-box players that you are talking about.

First, I do not believe any vanilla flavor of linux will ever work. There are numerous reasons for this ranging from the aforementioned philosophical differences, i.e. lack of interest, aversion, and even defiance; to the practical and financial issues. This means you are unlikely to be able to grab a PC off the shelf install it with the OS of your choice and watch pay TV any time in the near future.

Also, what's wrong with the "sealed-box"? I think we're past the days where these STBs only ran applications supplied by the manufacturer. As long as that box will run XBMC in addition to performing its primary task, what's the issue?

What I pictured when I suggested my solution are the requirements being: small form factor, low power, flexible, and low cost. These key points are my primary rationale for suggesting linux. In fact I believe the original posting I answered never specified linux; only the desire to use an alternative interface.

Basically you need to ask yourself what are your needs? Is running 3rd party software the primary requirement? If so, the proposed Android solution I suggested would allow you to use XBMC, MythTV, or the solution of your choice. To make this easier to understand I'll illustrate with an example.
Note: its not a direct example but I don't feel its necessary to walk through both iOS and Android solutions.

On Apple's iOS platform any developer can make an app that can play DRM. The app creates an instance of the iPod secure media player and simply controls certain parameters such as displayed content size, volume, trick play, start and stop. The developer has no access to the media, nor directly to iPod player itself. The additional catch is you must go through Apple's iTunes pipeline. Basically you're just automating the process of a person playing media through iPod. This works for pay TV as well since the user wants to replay the content, not modify it. In the case of XBMC it would act as a front end.

Also you might also ask why not simply make a DMC for a compatible DLNA device? The answer to that is first-- two units. Second, you would not be able to modify the front end. The solution would end up similar to using a Colossus to grab frames from your cable box. The solution would neither be elegant nor provide tight integration.

I'm not seeing anything in SoftDMA2 that would allow it to be certified to play copy protected TV.

What does being certified for copy protected TV have to do with it? HDHR is certified for cable card and Project:Connect suggests that it will also be certified for DLNA with DTCP-IP acting as protection during transport. Cablelabs has also partnered with DTLA (DTCP's governing body) to allow DTCP-IP certified DLNA devices access to pay TV content. In effect HDHR should be handing off DRM duties to DTCP-IP as it primary source of content protection. A certified and compatible DLNA agent should then be able to authenticate and receive the content for playback, DVR duties, etc.

The big and unanswered question, since we currently have no examples, is: what devices will be allowed to authenticate? Will they authenticate fully and allow for copy-never access or will they authenticate partially and be restricted to copy-once or lesser access.

[tcc]

Does this mean that I'll be able to send 0x02 cci flag protected channels to XBMC running on Linux?

Not just Linux XBMC but Windows also.

SD Project Connect is a mystery. SD could answer this question.

[gtb]

SD Project Connect is a mystery. SD could answer this question.

I would suggest you wait for the CES timed announcements for those answers..... (only a few weeks away now)

[tcc]

I'm not seeing anything in SoftDMA2 that would allow it to be certified to play copy protected TV.

What does being certified for copy protected TV have to do with it? HDHR is certified for cable card and Project:Connect suggests that it will also be certified for DLNA with DTCP-IP acting as protection during transport. Cablelabs has also partnered with DTLA (DTCP's governing body) to allow DTCP-IP certified DLNA devices access to pay TV content. In effect HDHR should be handing off DRM duties to DTCP-IP as it primary source of content protection. A certified and compatible DLNA agent should then be able to authenticate and receive the content for playback, DVR duties, etc.

My understanding is that CableLabs certification and qualification is required for applications that play back copy protected TV. No?

http://www.cablelabs.com/certqual/

Can SoftDMA2 which is a DMP with DTCP-IP transport play copy protected TV from HDHR?

[tcc]

SD Project Connect is a mystery. SD could answer this question.

I would suggest you wait for the CES timed announcements for those answers..... (only a few weeks away now)

lol, of course, SD will not reveal any secrets prior to CES. Should be interesting

[m509272]

I certainly know little to nothing about this but is there any possibility of using an inexpensive USB dongle or maybe a PCI Express X1 card to provide whatever security would be needed on the PC side?

[calic]

My understanding is that CableLabs certification and qualification is required for applications that play back copy protected TV. No?

http://www.cablelabs.com/certqual/

Can SoftDMA2 which is a DMP with DTCP-IP transport play copy protected TV from HDHR?

"Using DTCP (Digital Transmission Copy Protection)-protected secure links among consumer electronics devices, cable subscribers will be able to enjoy digital cable programming, including high-definition and VOD cable content, on consumer electronics devices and personal computers on digital home networks. The approval permits CableLabs licensees under DFAST, CHILA, and DCAS to protect pay-per-view and video-on-demand transmissions against unauthorized copying and unauthorized internet retransmission, while assuring consumers' ability to record broadcast and subscription programming, in digital formats, for personal use."

http://www.cablelabs.com/news/pr/2007/0 ... 82307.html

Additional info in their DTCP FAQ:

http://www.dtcp.com/faq.aspx#faq4

There's also a few other docs I can't link.

DTCP solutions were "approved" in 2007 but actualization still hasn't happened outside of closed ecosystems.

[BrainStormer]

So will there be the ability to have a subscribed channel recorded in encrypted format by a backend (Not WMC) and then streamed back through the prime on it's way to a DTCP-IP capable DMR?

[MajikUF]

Well what about the WD TV? I know that under the LiveTV section it does have a Hauppauge app to stream from their device so I would think we could get the same benefit.

[papreston]

I'm using firmware 20121226beta1

The tuners don't show under upnp in xbmc.

Thanks

[DataCrypt]

Anyone have any more news on the ability to possibly play protected content (like that from Bright House Networks - where everything is copy-once protected) using the new HDHR Prime firmware supporting DLNA and XBMC?

The software/hardware needs to support DTCP-IP.

I'd really like to use XBMC to watch TV and my movies - it's a great interface and far above Windows Media Center (WMC). I'm looking for alternatives to WMC (which is the ONLY one to support this now). Was really hoping for some other device from SiliconDust for this at CES.

Wonder about this
http://www.digion.com/en/pf/dtcpipdms/index.htm
and
https://www.elliptictech.com/en/products-a-solutions/applications-software/dtcp
They seem to have software and an SDK

Best Regards,

DataCrypt